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IN RE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY— 
MARRIED COUPLES, COMMON LAW MARRIAGES, 
AND SAME-SEX PARTNERS: 
ORTH V. ORTH 
 
JOHN V. ORTH∗ 
I. BACKGROUND 
An article in a recent issue of the North Dakota Law Review recom-
mends the traditional version of tenancy by the entirety for married couples, 
common law marriages, and same-sex partners, and defends the tenancy 
against critics who advocate that it should be “abolished, altered, or li-
mited.”1  The author, Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, reviews the characteristics 
of the three modern concurrent estates—tenancy in common, joint tenancy, 
and tenancy by the entirety—and concludes that tenancy by the entirety is 
“the best alternative for couples owning property” because it provides both 
“asset protection and probate avoidance.”2 
Each tenant in common has a share that is alienable inter vivos, devisa-
ble at death, and inheritable in the absence of a valid will.  By contrast, each 
joint tenant has a share that is alienable, but neither devisable nor inherita-
ble.  Alienation by a joint tenant has the effect of withdrawing the alienated 
share from the joint tenancy and converting the title to that share into a 
tenancy in common.  If not alienated, the share of a dying joint tenant does 
not pass by devise or inheritance, but inures to the benefit of the surviving 
joint tenant or tenants by right of survivorship, thereby avoiding probate.  
The peculiar character of an interest in joint tenancy—an interest in fee 
simple that is alienable, but neither devisable nor inheritable—is both its 
chief advantage and its most serious drawback.  As one court recently 
observed: 
The right of survivorship makes joint tenancies a popular form of 
property ownership.  Yet, the concomitant right of each joint te-
nant to destroy the joint tenancy, and thus the right of survivor-
 
∗William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.  
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.  Professor 
Orth contributes the chapters on concurrent estates to THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (David A. 
Thomas ed., 1994 (1st ed.); 2004 (2d ed.); & annual supplements). 
1. Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, Tenancy by the Entirety:  The Traditional Version is the Best 
Alternative for Married Couples, Common Law Marriages, and Same-Sex Partners, 84 N.D. L. 
REV. 23, 49 (2008). 
2. Id. at 34. 
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ship, is not always popular, particularly for the surviving joint te-
nant.  As Hamlet observed in a different context, “ay, there’s the 
rub.”3 
Unique among the concurrent estates, the traditional tenancy by the entirety, 
limited to married couples, does not permit alienation by either tenant; that 
is, neither tenant acting alone can sever the tenancy by sale or partition 
thereby destroying the right of survivorship.  Nor can either tenant 
individually encumber the property.  For this reason, Rosich-Schwartz 
concludes that the traditional tenancy by the entirety is not only the best 
alternative for married couples, but also that it should be extended to 
couples joined by common law marriage and to same-sex partners. 
Rosich-Schwartz identified me, Professor John V. Orth, as the principal 
critic of the traditional tenancy by the entirety.4  According to Rosich-
Schwartz, I believe that the tenancy by the entirety “should be abolished.”5  
Rosich-Schwartz also (somewhat inconsistently) asserts that I believe it 
should be expanded “to make it available to all individuals.”6  Rosich-
Schwartz maintains that “[as] stated by Professor Orth, one of the main 
criticisms of the tenancy by the entirety is that it looks more like a joint te-
nancy than the original tenancy by the entirety ever appeared.”7  Rosich-
Schwartz states as my position that the tenancy should be abolished because 
it is now practically indistinguishable from a joint tenancy”8 and that “the 
tenancy by the entirety does not provide the ‘easy escape hatch’ that is cur-
rently provided to joint tenants in the form of partition or alienation of the 
property.”9  While Rosich-Schwartz cites only my article, she states that 
“[o]ther critics argue that current judicial decisions confuse and complicate 
the application of tenancy by the entirety, creating the need for improvisa-
tions of the traditional version of the tenancy.”10  According to Rosich-
Schwartz, I state that manipulation by a large majority of jurisdictions “sig-
nals the demise of the tenancy.”11  “Another criticism of the tenancy by the 
 
3. In Re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 493 (Iowa 2007). 
4. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 49.  The other principal critic identified by Rosich-
Schwartz is Professor Peter Carrozzo. Id. at 50.  The present author is speaking only for himself 
and not for Professor Carrozzo. 
5. Id. at 51 n.188 (citing John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety:  The Strange Career of the 
Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 47-48 (1997)). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 52 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 48). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 53 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 44).  If this is a criticism, Rosich-Schwartz is also a 
critic.  She advocates for the traditional tenancy by the entirety precisely because it prevents 
“unilateral conveyances.”  Id. at 52. 
10. Id. at 53 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46). 
11. Id. at 54 n.206 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46). 
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entirety concerns the unilateral creditors’ rights upon the property.”12  Rely-
ing again only on my article, Rosich-Schwartz argues that “[m]ost critics 
believe that this is the biggest flaw of the tenancy by the entirety, because 
the tenancy denies attachment of creditors’ rights based on a false belief 
that marriage is a unity of two becoming one.”13 
The only reservation I have in wholeheartedly agreeing with Rosich-
Schwartz is that I am Professor Orth!  Rather than advocating that the 
tenancy by the entirety should be “abolished, altered, or limited,”14 I simply 
recounted “the strange career of the common-law marital estate” in my 
1997 article repeatedly cited by Rosich-Schwartz.15  In fact, I expressly rec-
ognized in that article that at least one reason some states retain the tradi-
tional tenancy by the entirety is “to provide protection to marital property”16 
and that recognition of the traditional tenancy by the entirety in many states 
compensates for “a miserly homestead exemption.”17  Like Rosich-
Schwartz, I considered the possibility that the tenancy would someday be 
extended to couples that are not, “for one reason or another, legally united” 
(that is, to same-sex partners) and concluded that the tenancy by the entirety 
could “probably survive the shock.”18  Indeed, I ended my article with the 
observation that the tenancy was a hardy survivor for the simple reason 
“that people are familiar with it and that, by and large, it works.”19  So con-
vinced am I of the advantages of the traditional tenancy by the entirety, that 
my wife and I have held our marital residence for the last thirty years in that 
form of concurrent ownership.20 
 
12. Id. at 54 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46). 
13. Id. (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 46).  Rosich-Schwartz notes that I wrote in my 1997 
article that treating two persons as one requires “Alice-in-Wonderland logic.”  Id. at n.211.  The 
problem I had in mind could just as easily be demonstrated by a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, The 
Gondoliers, in which two claimants to the throne are treated as one king until the correct monarch 
can be identified: 
Now, although we act as one person, we are, in point of fact, two persons. . . .  It is a 
legal fiction, and legal fictions are solemn things. . . .  It’s all very well to say we act 
as one person, but when you supply us with only one ration between us, I should de-
scribe it as a legal fiction carried a little too far. 
W.S. Gilbert, The Gondoliers, in THE COMPLETE ANNOTATED GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 921 (Ian 
Bradley ed., 1996). 
14. Id. at 49 (citing Orth, supra note 5, at 47-48). 
15. Orth, supra note 5, at 35. 
16. Id. at 42. 
17. Id. at 48. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 48-49. 
20. Deed from Thomas Bain Kirchner and wife, Genevieve O. Kirchner to John V. Orth and 
wife, Noreen Nolan Orth, (Feb. 26, 1979) (recorded at Orange County, N.C., Registry of Deeds, 
Book 306, page 663).  By law in North Carolina any conveyance of real property to a husband and 
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In defiance of my supposed criticisms of the traditional tenancy by the 
entirety, Rosich-Schwartz argues that “[m]ost couples need asset protection 
against unilateral conveyances and unilateral creditors, due to the perma-
nent aspect of their relationship.”21  She assumes that this “permanent as-
pect” exists only in “quasi-matrimonial relationships similar to marriage,” 
and that “married couples, common law marriages, and same-sex part-
ners . . . are the only quasi-matrimonial relationships currently in exis-
tence.”22  “[U]nmarried individuals owning property outside of any type of 
permanent relationship do not need the asset protection available to married 
couples and mutual beneficiaries, because most of this property is later de-
vised, sold, or otherwise encumbered as they wish.”23  For these couples, 
Rosich-Schwartz seems to think that the alternatives of joint tenancy or 
tenancy in common are adequate. 
Tenancy by the entirety is only one of the many advantages the law of-
fers to married couples, and while extending its availability to same-sex 
partners may be desirable, it would not alone be sufficient to make such 
partnerships the legal equivalent of marriage.  In a 2003 article that Rosich-
Schwartz did not cite, I reflected on the debate concerning same-sex mar-
riage.24  I reviewed the consequences of legal marriage, particularly the 
property consequences, including the availability of tenancy by the entirety, 
and observed that same-sex partners, if excluded from legal marriage, can 
by other arrangements approximate only some of these consequences.  I 
then considered whether legal recognition of some form of parallel legal 
 
wife vests title in them as tenants by the entirety “unless a contrary intention is expressed in the 
conveyance.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (2007). 
21. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51.  While I actually agree with Rosich-Schwartz con-
cerning the desirability of protecting couples against “unilateral conveyances,” I am less comfort-
able with the blanket protection afforded by the traditional tenancy by the entirety against “unila-
teral creditors.”  As to creditors who voluntarily extended credit to one spouse under circums-
tances where the marital status of the debtor was known or knowable, I agree with her; but I am 
uneasy where the creditor is a tort creditor, who had no opportunity to examine the creditworthi-
ness of the tortfeasor. 
22. Id. at 50.  I am not sure why Rosich-Schwartz describes married couples as in a “quasi-
matrimonial relationship.”  Married couples are in the only “matrimonial relationship” known to 
the law.  Common law marriages, where recognized, also create a “matrimonial relationship.”  In 
fact, the only difference between “married couples” and “common law marriages” concerns the 
formality necessary to enter into the legal relationship, although the lack of documentary evidence 
of the relationship complicates the recognition of tenancy by the entirety. See, e.g., In Re Vene-
ziale, 267 B.R. 695, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (concerning whether a couple established com-
mon law marriage).  In the remainder of this article, I will not discuss common law marriages, 
focusing instead on same-sex partners. 
23. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51. 
24. John V. Orth, Night Thoughts:  Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 3 NEV. L.J. 560 (2003) [hereinafter Orth, Night Thoughts]. 
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relationship—”reciprocal beneficiary relationship,”25 “civil union,”26 
“domestic partnership,”27 “civil partnership”28—providing all the conse-
quences of legal marriage (including tenancy by the entirety) would elimi-
nate the objections to excluding same-sex partners.  In other words, I won-
dered whether there is independent significance to the label “marriage.”  
Finally, I asked how, if we decide to extend the consequences of legal mar-
riage, we should decide which same-sex partners to include.  In other 
words, are all same-sex partners the same? 
The last question was prompted by a story I told about two sisters, 
Maud and Mary, who lived together for 93 years.29  Their relationship en-
titled them to no legal benefits.  They could not take title to real property as 
tenants by the entirety (where that estate is recognized) or hold it as com-
munity property (where married persons hold property under that regime).  
As a result, they lost valuable protections from creditors’ claims and ad-
vantages with respect to inheritance and estate taxation.  They could not 
check the box “married filing jointly” on their state and federal income tax 
returns, which would have entitled them to reduced rates of taxation.30  
They were denied survivors’ benefits from private pension plans and from 
Social Security.  I concluded that, although their relationship was as perma-
nent as humanly possible, “[t]he law simply ignored the fact that they had 
lived together as a couple for nearly a century.”31 
I realized at the time that my original reflections were not “likely to 
please all the participants in the debate concerning same-sex marriage.”32  
 
25. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (2007).  The consequences of marriage under the Hawaiian 
statute are available to all couples “who are legally prohibited from marrying”—not only “two 
individuals who are of the same gender” (that is, same-sex partners), but also “two individuals 
who are related to one another.”  The statute expressly includes “a widowed mother and her un-
married son”—an example, as I recognized in my earlier reflections, that implicates a “common 
stereotype of the male homosexual.”  Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 570 n.59. 
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:A (2007); N.J. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1201 (1999). 
27. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6; 2006 D.C. Law 16-79; 2007 Or. Laws Ch. 99; see also 
Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 672 (H.P. 1152; L.D. 1579); id. ch. 347 (H.P. 1256; L.D. 1703). 
28. Civil Partnership Act, c. 33 2004 (Eng. & Wales); see Andrew Flagg, Note, Civil 
Partnership in the United Kingdom and a Moderate Proposal for Change in the United States, 22 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 613, 614 (2005) (analyzing the British Civil Partnership Act and advo-
cating similar legislation in the United States). 
29. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 560-61. 
30. Id. at 564-65.  In my original reflections, I recognized that for some taxpayers marriage is 
actually a disadvantage, incurring the so-called “marriage penalty.”  Id. 
31. Id. at 561. 
32. Id. at 569.  I was surprised to see that a prominent opponent of same-sex marriage in-
cluded my reflections in a list of articles supporting, lauding, or endorsing the argument in favor.  
Lynn D. Wardle, The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 309, 309 & 
app. A (2003-04).  Professor Wardle admitted that he had not read all the articles he mentioned.  
Id.  He must have skipped my article. 
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To the extent that the demand of same-sex partners was a demand for broad 
social acceptance of their sexual relationship, I recognized that it might not 
be satisfied by permitting euphemistic substitutes, even if the property con-
sequences of these new legal arrangements were identical to the property 
consequences attached to marriage.33  And by asking whether couples not 
bound by a sexual relationship might also in fairness have a claim to the 
same legal consequences as marriage (or its substitute), I wondered whether 
the debate was “about fairness in general or about fairness to a particular 
sexual minority?”34  My proposal, in other words, was to expand the discus-
sion to include all partners who were excluded for whatever reason.  “If sex 
could be disregarded,” I wrote, “the debate concerning same-sex marriage 
could be transformed into a discussion concerning proper criteria for admis-
sion to a legal relationship involving social and economic support: less 
sexy, but perhaps thereby more productive.”35  Two cases decided by 
prominent courts within weeks of one another in 2008 deal with some of the 
issues I raised in that article.36 
II. ILLUSTRATIVE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
A. IN RE MARRIAGE CASES 
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court decided In re Mar-
riage Cases, holding that the state could not constitutionally limit legal 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.37  The California Constitution’s guaran-
tees of privacy and due process38 encompassed a constitutional right to 
 
33. As a property lawyer, I am perhaps more concerned with consequences than with names.  
Whether easement or irrevocable license, inter vivos gift or declaration of trust, real covenant or 
equitable servitude, will or will substitute—in property law, if it comes to the same thing, the label 
does not really matter.  But as a legal historian, I am uncomfortably aware that arguing that the 
label does not matter may, when social relations are concerned, be reminiscent of the United 
States Supreme Court’s dismissal of the claim that a statute requiring “separate but equal” facili-
ties for the black race was a “badge of inferiority.”  “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
34. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 569-70. 
35. Id. at 571. 
36. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384 (Cal. 2008); Burden v. The United Kingdom, 
App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
37. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 402.  On November 4, 2008, California voters adopted 
Proposition 8 adding Section 7.5 to Article I of the California Constitution: “Only marriage be-
tween a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” 
38. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalien-
able rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); id. § 7(a) (“A 
person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .”).  While 
basing its decision on the state constitution, the California Supreme Court found support for its 
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marry, that is, “the opportunity of an individual to establish—with the per-
son with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life—an offi-
cially recognized and protected family possessing mutual rights and respon-
sibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity accorded a union tra-
ditionally designated as marriage.”39  The constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection40 meant that a legal distinction could not be drawn without 
justification between couples essentially similar.  Because the majority 
found that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples “wish to enter into a 
formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family relation-
ship that affords the same rights and privileges and imposes the same obli-
gations and responsibilities,”41 they held that both were entitled to the legal 
status of marriage.42 
Although California’s Domestic Partnership Act conferred nearly 
identical legal consequences on registered same-sex domestic partners as on 
married couples,43 it was constitutionally inadequate because it denied 
same-sex partners the label “marriage.”44  Assigning a different designation 
to same-sex partners while reserving the historic designation of “marriage” 
exclusively for opposite-sex couples posed, the court held, “a serious risk of 
denying the official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal dig-
nity and respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry.”45  
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached the same con-
clusion on similar facts,46 as did the Connecticut Supreme Court in 200847 
 
reasoning in federal cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the birth control 
case, which it referred to as “seminal.”  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432. 
39. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399 (emphasis added). 
40. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (“A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the 
laws . . .”). 
41. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435. 
42. See id. at 402. 
43. See id. at 416 (describing nine minor differences that remained). 
44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (b)(5)(B).  The California Domestic Partnership Act also made 
domestic partnership available to opposite-sex couples if either is eligible for Social Security and 
over 62 years of age.  It is unclear whether this part of the Act is still valid. 
45. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435.  The majority thought a different label was 
particularly likely to imply second-class citizenship “because of the widespread disparagement 
that gay individuals historically have faced.”  Id. at 401-02. 
46. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004) (“The dissimili-
tude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered 
choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, 
couples to second-class status.”); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
969 (Mass. 2003) (holding state marriage laws unconstitutional insofar as they denied marriage to 
same-sex couples). 
47. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding Con-
necticut’s civil union statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn, unconstitutional). 
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and the Iowa Supreme Court in 2009,48 although a number of other state 
courts have reached the contrary conclusion about the constitutional neces-
sity of recognizing same-sex marriage.49 
In my earlier reflections, I suggested that “[t]heoretically the simplest, 
but practically the most difficult, solution to the problem would be the eli-
mination of the legal status of marriage.”50  But the California Supreme 
Court held that not only is there a constitutional “right to marry” but also 
that it obligates the state to take “at least some affirmative action to ac-
knowledge and support the family unit.”51  California must, the court held, 
“take affirmative action to grant official, public recognition to the couple’s 
relationship as a family.”52 
B. BURDEN V. UNITED KINGDOM 
Only a few weeks earlier, on April 29, 2008, the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights decided Burden v. The United Kingdom, 
holding that the United Kingdom, which recognizes same-sex civil partner-
ships, can refuse legal recognition to a couple formed by two co-habiting 
sisters.53  Like Maud and Mary in my original reflections, the Burden sisters 
have lived together “in a stable, committed and mutually supportive rela-
tionship all their lives.”54  For the last thirty-one years, they have shared a 
house built on land they inherited from their parents, real property that has 
significantly appreciated in value.55  They hold title to the house and adjoin-
 
48. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (“the language in Iowa Code section 
595.2 limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken”). 
49. See generally Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006); 
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App.); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 
15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App.).  But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection required that legislature either amend marriage statutes to 
admit same-sex couples or grant domestic partnerships same rights as married couples). 
50. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 567. 
51. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal. 2008).  The Court did not decide whether 
the label “marriage” is a “core element of the state constitutional right to marry” or whether the 
state could constitutionally “assign a name other than marriage [as the official designation of the 
family . . . relationship] for all couples.”  Id. at 434. 
52. Id. at 427. 
53. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 65-66 (2008), 
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.  The case, filed on March 29, 2005, had previously 
been heard by a Chamber within the Fourth Section of the Court, which also had ruled against the 
sisters.  Burden and Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 4 
(Chamber 2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
54. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10 (2008), 
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
55. Id. 
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ing land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.56  Each has savings 
and investments in her sole name, and each has executed a will leaving all 
her property to the other.57  Age eighty-three and ninety, the sisters have an 
“awful fear” that on the death of the first to die, the survivor will be forced 
to sell the real estate to satisfy the inheritance tax, requiring her to move 
from her familiar surroundings.58  By contrast, the United Kingdom allows 
married couples and registered civil partners to pass property tax-free to the 
survivor, but civil partnership is not available to the sisters because they are 
“within the prohibited degrees of relationship.”59 
The sisters’ suit was based on the argument that they will be treated 
differently at the death of the first to die from other persons “in relevantly 
similar situations” and that this constitutes unlawful discrimination in viola-
tion of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms.60  In other words, the sisters argued that they were like a 
couple formed by marriage or civil partnership, but denied the legal conse-
quences of those relationships.  A majority of judges who heard the case at 
first instance in a Chamber within the Fourth Section of the Court agreed 
with the applicants that they were indeed similarly situated, but deferred to 
 
56. Id. para. 11. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. para. 32.  One of the dissenting judges in the Chamber was moved by the fact that 
“[t]his house is not simply a piece of property–this house is something with which they have a 
special emotional bond, this house is their home.” Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 
13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 1-2 (2006) (Pavlovschi, J., dissenting), available at http://echr. 
coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.  Of course, the sisters’ financial advisor should have recommended insur-
ance on each sister’s life in an amount sufficient to satisfy the tax.  Given the sisters’ advanced 
ages, this is now probably impracticable as a solution.  In any event, married couples and civil 
partners do not need to bear the expense of insurance in order to protect the survivor from a forced 
sale. 
59. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 17 (2008), 
available at  http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.  The Civil Partnership Act 2004 provides that “[a] 
couple is eligible to form a civil partnership if they are (i) of the same sex (ii) not already married 
or in a civil partnership (iii) over the age of 16 [and] (iv) not within the prohibited degrees of 
relationship.”  Id. 
60. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Con-
vention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” Id.  Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties. 
Id. 
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the government on the design of its system of taxation.61  In terms of Euro-
pean jurisprudence, the United Kingdom was entitled to a “wide margin of 
appreciation.”62  At the sisters’ request, the case was heard anew by the 
Grand Chamber of the Court. 
The legal representative of the United Kingdom denied that there is a 
“true analogy” between the sisters and legal couples, because the sisters are 
“connected by birth rather than by a decision to enter into a formal relation-
ship recognised by law.”63  When the Civil Partnership Bill was in progress 
of passage through parliament, a government supporter declared that “[t]his 
Bill is about same-sex couples whose relationships are completely different 
from those of siblings.”64  In response, the sisters argued that they “had cho-
sen to live together in a loving, committed and stable relationship for sev-
eral decades, sharing their only home, to the exclusion of other partners.”65  
Furthermore, they claimed that their choice was “just as much an expres-
sion of their respective self-determination and personal development as 
would have been the case had they been joined by marriage or a civil 
partnership.”66 
The Grand Chamber concluded, on the contrary, that “the relationship 
between siblings is qualitatively of a different nature to that between mar-
ried couples and homosexual civil partners.”67  The essential difference, ac-
cording to the majority of judges in the Grand Chamber, is that siblings are 
 
61. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms of 4 November 1950, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
62. Burden and Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61 
(2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.  Two dissenting judges in the Chamber, 
while agreeing that states were entitled to a “wide margin of appreciation,” nonetheless thought 
that “once the legislature decides that a permanent union of two persons could or should enjoy tax 
privileges, it must be able to justify why such a possibility has been offered to some unions while 
continuing to be denied to others.” Id. para. 1-2 (Bonello and Garlicki, JJ., dissenting). 
63. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61 (2008), avail-
able at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.  The government of the United Kingdom detailed the 
differences between the sisters and legal couples: 
The very essence of their relationship was different, because a married or Civil Part-
nership Act couple chose to become connected by a formal relationship, recognised by 
law, with a number of legal consequences; whereas for sisters, the relationship was an 
accident of birth.  Secondly, the relationship between siblings was indissoluble, whe-
reas that between married couples and civil partners might be broken.  Thirdly, a mar-
ried couple and civil partners made a financial commitment by entering into a formal 
relationship recognised by law and, if separated, the court could divide their property 
and order financial provision to be made by one partner to the other.  No such finan-
cial commitment arose by virtue of the relationship between siblings. 
Id. para. 49. 
64. Id. para. 20 (quoting Lord Alli, a Labour peer). 
65. Id. para. 53. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. para. 62. 
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joined by consanguinity, while marriage and civil partnership is forbidden 
to persons “within the prohibited degrees of relationship.”68  According to 
the majority, “[r]ather than the length or the supportive nature of the rela-
tionship, what is determinative, is the existence of a public undertaking, 
carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of a contractual nature.”69  
Since the sisters did not have such a publicly recognized contract, they were 
more similar to an unmarried heterosexual couple or an unregistered civil 
partnership.  The sisters’ argument that they did not have “a publicly recog-
nized contract” because the public would not recognize their contract was 
unavailing, leading one of the dissenting judges to say that he found the 
majority’s argument “circular, or I might even say concentric.”70 
Although the majority discreetly avoided mentioning the sexual basis 
of marriage and civil partnership, two judges writing separately did.  Judge 
Björgvinsson, concurring in the result, recognized the “sexual nature of the 
relationship” as one of the “important differences” between the sisters and a 
married or civil partnership couple but nonetheless thought the sisters had 
more in common than not with such couples for purposes of inheritance 
tax.71  Like the Chamber, however, he would have allowed the state discre-
tion to decide when and to what extent to provide exemptions.72  Judge 
Zupančič, dissenting, bluntly asked whether it was the nature of the physi-
cal relationship that distinguished the couples:  “Is it having sex with one 
another that provides the rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest?”73 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is, of course, a bit unfair to read the opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights together with the opinion of the California Supreme Court 
 
68. Id. para. 17. 
69. Id. para. 62, 65. 
70. Id. para. 3 (Borrego Borrego, J., dissenting).  It is at least possible that the result in the 
case would have been different if the sisters had begun by seeking, and being denied, registration 
as a civil partnership.  In explanation of their failure to take this step, the sisters stated that “[t]hey 
had not raised a general complaint about their preclusion from entering into a civil partnership, 
because their concern was focused upon inheritance tax discrimination and they would have en-
tered into a civil partnership had that route been open to them.” Id. para. 53.  On the other hand, 
because the majority found that “the relationship between siblings is qualitatively of a different 
nature to that between married couples and homosexual civil partners,” that complaint too would 
probably have been rejected. Id. para. 62. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (Björgvinsson, J., concurring). 
73. Id. (Zupančič, J., dissenting).  Judge Borrego Borrego added that “[t]his judgment of the 
Grand Chamber will no doubt be described as politically correct.” Id. (Borrego Borrego, J., 
dissenting). 
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because courts properly answer only the questions asked.  The California 
Supreme Court was not asked whether it was a violation of privacy, due 
process, or equal protection to exclude cohabiting sisters from the benefits 
of marriage or domestic partnership.74  The court did, however, emphasize 
that its conclusion that “the constitutional right to marry properly must be 
interpreted to apply to gay individuals and gay couples does not mean that 
this constitutional right similarly must be understood to extend to poly-
gamous or incestuous relationships.”75  The court recognized a “strong and 
adequate justification” for denying state recognition to such relationships 
“because of their potentially detrimental effect on a sound family envi-
ronment.”76  Marriage between siblings may continue to be prohibited in 
California, even presumably between sisters who did not have (or desire) an 
incestuous relationship.  But, then, the English sisters were not asking to be 
allowed to marry, only to secure the economic benefits accorded married 
couples and same-sex partners.  Rather than sex, they were concerned about 
those other perennials, death and taxes. 
Like the California Supreme Court, the European Court of Human 
Rights did not have to decide whether denial of the label “marriage” to 
same-sex partners was discriminatory.77  As a dissenting judge in the Grand 
 
74. The California Domestic Partnership Act defined “domestic partners” as “two adults who 
have chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual car-
ing.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (Deering 2006).  The partners may not be “related by blood in a 
way that would prevent them from being married to each other in this state.” Id. § 297(b)(3).  The 
Act also made domestic partnership available to opposite-sex couples if either is eligible for So-
cial Security and over 62 years of age. Id. § 297(b)(5)(B).  It is unclear whether such couples must 
now accept the label “marriage.”  If domestic partnership remains available for such couples, 
perhaps room could be made for the elderly sisters by eliminating the restriction on blood rela-
tives.  Counsel for the sisters pointed out to the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
that “there was no requirement in the 2004 [Civil Partnership] Act for those wishing to enter into a 
civil partnership to be in a sexual relationship with each other.” Burden and Burden v. The United 
Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 50 (2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/ 
en/hudoc.  The Hawaii statute extends the legal consequences of marriage to all couples “who are 
legally prohibited from marrying”—not only “two individuals who are of the same gender” (that 
is, same-sex partners), but also “two individuals who are related to one another.” HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 572C-2 (2006). 
75. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434 n.52 (Cal. 2008). 
76. Id. 
77. The majority of judges on the California Supreme Court thought that “there is no ques-
tion but that these two categories of individuals [opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples] are 
sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine 
‘whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.’” Id. at 435 n.54 
(quoting from People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 37 (Cal. 2006)).  Two dissenting judges in the 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights agreed. Burden and Burden v. The United 
Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 61 (2006), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/ 
en/hudoc. See Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Borrego, 
Borrego, J., dissenting) (2008) available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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Chamber pointed out, the sisters were already a “same-sex couple.”78  The 
difficulty they faced was not their sex, but their family relationship.  Since 
marriage was not involved, the incest taboo was not implicated in the Euro-
pean case.  The United Kingdom seemingly had the opportunity to open 
civil partnership to sisters in appropriate cases.79  In fact, an amendment ac-
tually adopted in the House of Lords during the Civil Partnership Bill’s pas-
sage through parliament would have done just that: extend civil partnership 
and the associated inheritance tax concession to family members “within 
the ‘prohibited degrees of relationship’” if they (i) were over 30 years of 
age, (ii) had co-habited for at least 12 years, and (iii) were not already mar-
ried or in a civil partnership with another person.80  But the House of Com-
mons dropped the amendment because the Bill was “not the appropriate 
legislative base” on which to deal with the “concerns of relatives.”81 
The California Supreme Court held that “marriage” was the proper la-
bel for the “official family relationship of same-sex couples”82 and insisted 
upon the need for “official, public recognition” of same-sex partners’ “rela-
tionship as a family.”83  The European Court of Human Rights seemed to 
agree that a family could be formed only by choice; the sisters were bound 
by consanguinity, not by “a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of 
rights and obligations of a contractual nature.”84  Family by choice is a 
novel concept, at least in the common law, which long based its family law 
on relationships of blood—on consanguinity.85  In a paradox worthy of a 
 
78. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Borrego Borrego, J., 
dissenting) (2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
79. Orth, Night Thoughts, supra note 24, at 569 (footnote omitted) (observing in my earlier 
reflections that “[t]wo siblings living together for a lifetime could be added without too much 
trouble.  But what if there were three—or more?”).  The Irish government, in its submission to the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, seems to have been concerned about the 
same thing:  “It would be truly extraordinary if the enactment of legislation conferring rights upon 
same-sex couples who chose to register their relationship could have the effect of requiring the 
State to extend the entitlements thereby conferred to a potentially infinite class of persons in coha-
biting relationships.”  Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 57 
(2008), available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
80. Id. para. 19. 
81. Id. para. 20 (quoting Jacqui Smith, M.P., Deputy Minister for Women and Equality).  I 
do not know whether the amendment adopted in the House of Lords—or the Burden sisters’ law-
suit—was the product of political maneuvering. 
82. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434 (Cal. 2008). 
83. Id. at 427. 
84. Burden v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 65 (2008), 
available at http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
85. For centuries inheritance was limited to blood relatives. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 208-36 (1765) (listing canons of inheritance).  Ex-
cept for the addition of surviving spouses, it generally still is, which is why, in the absence of a 
will, sisters can inherit from one another.  See also Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background 
of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971) (noting that until legal adoption was 
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Gilbert and Sullivan operetta,86 the European Court’s holding was that the 
sisters could not form a family because they already were one!—albeit one 
that carried none of the legal consequences of a family of choice, formed by 
marriage or civil partnership. 
Despite modern society’s openness about the biological facts of life, 
the judges in these cases, both in California and in Europe, seem surpri-
singly reticent on the subject, preferring to talk about family, rather than 
about sex.  Yet the obvious explanation of the results in both cases seems to 
be a positive judgment about the sexual basis of same-sex partnerships, 
civil and domestic.  If the partners’ sex life is qualitatively the same as that 
of a traditional married couple’s, then “marriage” is not only the right name, 
but the only name, for their relationship.  And if a sexual bond is essential 
to a marriage or civil partnership, then the sisters’ relationship, however 
“stable, committed and mutually supportive” but asexual, is qualitatively 
different. 
Rather than defending the traditional tenancy by the entirety against 
imagined critics, Rosich-Schwartz could more profitably have labored to 
defend her argument that the tenancy should be extended to same-sex part-
ners, but no further.  In light of the frequency of divorce among married 
couples and separation among same-sex partners, as well as the lifelong re-
lationship of certain siblings, the answer might not have been as simple as 
the conclusory statement that only couples in “quasi-matrimonial relation-
ships, similar to marriage” have “any type of permanent relationship.”87 
 
 
recognized—in England by statute in 1926, in America by state legislation beginning around the 
middle of the nineteenth century—“children by choice” were unknown). 
86. Cf. W.S. Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance (1879), in THE COMPLETE ANNOTATED 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 239-41 (Ian Bradley ed. 1996) (“a paradox, a paradox, A most ingenious 
paradox!”—referring to articles of apprenticeship expiring on the apprentice’s twenty-first birth-
day when he was born on “leap day,” Feb. 29). 
87. Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 1, at 51. 
